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We show that every N-player K1 £ ¢¢¢ £ KN game possesses a
correlated equilibrium with at least
QN
i=1 Ki ¡ 1 ¡
PN
i=1 Ki(Ki ¡ 1)
zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K£¢¢¢£K games with
unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games.
Keywords Correlated equilibrium; ¯nite games.
1 The result
Consider an N-player K1 £¢¢¢£ KN normal form game ° = (N;S;f°igN
i=1),
where, for each player i = 1;:::;N, Si is a set of pure strategies with
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1Ki = #Si ¸ 2 and °i : S ! I R is a payo® function de¯ned on the set
of pure strategy pro¯les S = £N
i=1Si. Denote by ¢(S) the set of probability
distributions on S and by S¡i = £j6=iSj the set of pure strategy pro¯les of
the players other than i. Given si 2 Si and s¡i 2 S¡i, we sometimes write
s = (s¡i;si) for a generic element of S.
A probability distribution p = (p(s))s2S 2 ¢(S) is a correlated equilibrium
















We refer to these
PN
i=1 Ki(Ki ¡ 1) inequalities as the incentive constraints.
The notion of correlated equilibrium was introduced by Aumann [2] as a
rich generalization of Nash equilibrium. The set C ½ ¢(S) of correlated
equilibria is a nonempty convex polytope de¯ned by the incentive constraints,
as well as the nonnegativity constraints, p(s) ¸ 0, s 2 S, and the constraint
P
s2S p(s) = 1, the latter two guaranteeing p 2 ¢(S). Recall that a correlated
equilibrium that is a product measure is also a Nash equilibrium.
The purpose of this note is to point out that games with many players
have sparsely supported correlated equilibria. More precisely, the main result
is the following.
Theorem 1 Any N-player K1 £¢¢¢£KN game possesses a correlated equi-
librium with at least
QN
i=1 Ki ¡ 1 ¡
PN
i=1 Ki(Ki ¡ 1) zero entries.
To better understand the result, consider an N-player 2 £ ¢¢¢ £ 2 game.
There are 2N pure strategy pro¯les, yet the theorem implies the existence of
a correlated equilibrium with at least 2N ¡1¡2N zeros in its support. Thus,
there always exists a correlated equilibrium concentrated on an exponentially
small fraction of pure strategy pro¯les.
The result also has implications for the (non)existence of games with
unique fully supported correlated equilibria.
2Corollary 1 For N ¸ 3, there exist no K £¢¢¢£K games with unique fully
supported correlated equilibrium.
To see this, notice that, for any N ¸ 3 and K ¸ 2, we have
K
N¡1 ¡ N(K ¡ 1) ¸ 1:
Hence KN¡NK2+NK = K(KN¡1¡N(K¡1)) ¸ 2 since K ¸ 2. Therefore,
N Y
i=1
Ki ¡ 1 ¡
N X
i=1
Ki(Ki ¡ 1) = K
N ¡ NK
2 + NK ¡ 1 ¸ 1;
which means that, for N ¸ 3, there always exists a correlated equilibrium
with at least one zero entry and which cannot be fully supported.
This is to be contrasted with Nitzan [4], who shows that the set of two-
player K £ K games possessing a unique fully supported correlated equilib-
rium has positive measure for any K. It complements Nitzan's results by
showing that not only do such games have zero measure as soon as N ¸ 3,
but that such games simply cannot exist in these \remaining" cases.
Finally, recall that if an N-player game has a unique correlated equilib-
rium, then it must also be a Nash equilibrium and hence a product measure.
For simplicity, consider again 2 £ ¢¢¢ £ 2 games. The correlated equilibrium
has at least 2N ¡1¡2N zero entries and at most 2N +1 atoms, and hence,
as a product measure, it has at most log2(2N + 1) non-degenerate marginal
distributions. This implies the following fact suggesting that large games
with a unique correlated equilibrium must be quite \degenerate" in some
sense.
Corollary 2 Consider an N-player 2£¢¢¢£2 game with a unique correlated
equilibrium. At this equilibrium there are at most log2(2N + 1) players who
use a non-degenerate mixed strategy, all others play a pure strategy.
32 The proof
To simplify notation, set d =
QN
i=1 Ki¡1, m =
PN
i=1 Ki(Ki¡1), and assume,
without loss of generality, d > m. We identify a probability distribution
p 2 ¢(S) over the set of pure strategy pro¯les with a (d+1)-vector p of non-
negative components pj, satisfying
Pd+1
j=1 pj = 1. Each incentive constraint
takes the form of a linear inequality, which can be written as Ckp ¸ 0,
k = 1;:::;m.
Fix q0 2 C, which exists since C is nonempty, (e.g., Aumann [2], Hart and
Schmeidler [3]), and consider the a±ne subspace,




pj = 1 and Ckp = Ckq
0; k = 1;:::;mg:
By the dimension theorem, (e.g., Artin [1]), H0 has dimension at least d ¡
m, and any point in H0 satis¯es all the incentive constraints de¯ning C.
Moreover, since H0 ½ I Rd+1 is de¯ned by m + 1 equalities, there exist d ¡ m
entries whose values can be set arbitrarily, yet the system of m+1 equations
de¯ning H0 has a solution with these restricted values in the d ¡ m entries.
In particular, there exists q0 2 H0 in which d ¡ m entries are equal to, say,
¡1, and, without loss of generality, we can assume q0 to be of the form
q
0 = (¡1;:::;¡1;pd¡m+1;:::;pd¡m1;pd¡m1+1;:::;pd+1); m1 · m;
where the ¯rst d¡m entries are ¡1's, the next m¡m1 entries, pd¡m¡1;::;pd¡m1,
are nonpositive, and the remaining m1 + 1 entries, pd¡m1+1;::;pd+1, are pos-
itive (m1 + 1 is thus the number of positive entries of q0).
Consider now the line segment L ½ H0 between q0 and q0. It intersects
the union of hyperplanes, [
d¡m1
j=1 fp : pj = 0g, at least once and at most
d ¡ m1 times. Take the ¯rst intersection encountered when moving from q0
(2 C) towards q0 along L and denote the point of intersection by q1 2 C. Let
N1 ½ f1;:::;d ¡ m1g be the set of nonnegativity constraints holding with
4equality at q1. Set #N1 = n1 and notice that, since d ¡ m > 0, we have
n1 > 0. If d ¡ m ¡ n1 · 0, then we are done, since we have found a point
q1 2 C with at least n1 ¸ d ¡ m zero entries. If, however, d ¡ m ¡ n1 > 0,
then repeating the procedure (at most d¡m times) will eventually lead to a
point in C with the desired property. More speci¯cally, starting with ` = 1,
consider the following.
PROCEDURE: Suppose q` 2 C is given, together with the corresponding set
N` ½ f1;:::;d¡m`g, and numbers n` and m`, and suppose d¡m¡n` > 0.
Consider the a±ne subspace
H` = fp 2 I R
d+1 : pj = 0;j 2 N`;
d+1 X
j=1
pj = 1; Ckp = Ckq
`;k = 1;:::;mg:
By the dimension theorem, H` has dimension at least d ¡ m ¡ n`, and any
point in H` satis¯es: the nonnegativity constraints in N` with equality, the
constraint
Pd+1
j=1 pj = 1, and all the incentive constraints de¯ning C. Therefore
there exists q` 2 H` in which d ¡ m ¡ n` entries are equal to, say, ¡1, and,
again without loss, the positive entries coincide with the last m`+1+1 entries,
for some 0 · m`+1 · m; (it is always possible to relabel the coordinates and
the matrix C de¯ning the incentive constraints at each iteration `).
Next, as before, consider the line segment from q` (2 C) to q`. Again,
the segment is entirely contained in H` and it eventually leads to a (¯rst)
intersection, say at q`+1 2 C, with one or more of the hyperplanes de¯ning
[
d¡m`+1
j=1;j= 2N`fp : pj = 0g. Once again, the point q`+1 implies a corresponding set
N`+1 ½ f1;:::;d ¡ m`+1g of nonnegativity constraints holding with equality
at q`+1, as well as numbers n`+1 = #N`+1 (> n`) and m`+1 (· m), where
m`+1 + 1 is the number of positive entries of q`.
If d ¡ m ¡ n`+1 · 0, then, again, we are done; otherwise, repeat the
above procedure with ` = `+1. Notice that while d¡m¡n` > 0, repeating
the procedure always yields a new point q` with at least one entry equal
5to ¡1, which in turn yields a point q`+1 2 C with at least one additional
entry equal to zero, thus n`+1 > n`. Therefore, there exists ` · d ¡ m,
such that repeating the procedure ` times, eventually yields an a±ne space
H` of dimension greater or equal to zero, and a point q` satisfying at least
d¡m nonnegativity constraints with equality, the constraint
Pd+1
j=1 pj = 1, as
well as all the incentive constraints de¯ning C. In other words, it eventually
yields a point p = q` 2 C with at least d ¡ m zero entries, which completes
the proof.
References
[1] M. Artin. Algebra. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cli®s, NJ, 1991.
[2] R.J. Aumann. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1: 67-96, 1974.
[3] S. Hart and D. Schmeidler. Existence of correlated equilibria. Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 14: 18-25, 1989.
[4] N. Nitzan. Tight correlated equilibrium. Center for the Study of Ratio-
nality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Discussion Paper # 394, 2005.
6